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CORPORATIONS -PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS- IN TRANSITORY AC-
TIONS, ARISING OUTSIDE THE STATE, CALIFORNIA
MAY EXERCISE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A
NEVADA CORPORATION WHICH IS THE ALTER EGO
OF A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION. Brunzell Construction
Co. v. Harrah's Club (Cal. App. 1964).
Brunzell Construction Company, a Nevada contractor, brought an
action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against Har-
rah's Club, a Nevada corporation, and others, alleging: fraud and
misrepresentation, breach of a construction contract, tortious inter-
ference with a contract, refusal to make payments for materials, and
breach of express warranty; and seeking determination of liability
on a surety bond. The causes of action arose from a contract which
provided for the construction of a gambling casino in Reno, Nevada.
Brunzell Construction Company and Harrah's Club had executed the
contract in Nevada. The only relationship which the transaction had
with California was that the documents were prepared in Los An-
geles by architects and engineers, all of whom were doing business
in and were residents of Los Angeles County and who had been
joined in the action as defendants.
William F. Harrah, a resident of Nevada, was the sole stock-
holder of both Harrah's Club, a Nevada corporation, and Harrah's
South Shore Corporation, a California corporation. The officers and
the boards of directors of each corporation were identical. Harrah's
South Shore Corporation was in no way connected with the transac-
tion in question. The Superior Court of Los Angeles set aside service
of summons on Harrah's Club which had been served upon the Cali-
fornia Secretary of State in accordance with California Code of Civil
Procedure § 411. On appeal the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, reversed. The Nevada corporation was subject to the juris-
diction of the California court because there was sufficient business
activity on the part of Harrah's Club and Harrah's South Shore Cor-
poration' to bring the Nevada corporation within the scope of Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Code Procedure § 411. The court held in the
alternative that there was sufficient business activity on the part of
Harrah's Club alone to make it amenable to California jurisdiction.
Brunzell Construction Co. v. Harrah's Club, 225 Cal. App. 2d 734,
37 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1964).
1 The various business activities in, and contacts with, California of Harrah's Club
and Harrah's South Shore Corporation are described in detail in 225 Cal. App.
2d at 737-41, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 661-63. The court held that these activities estab.
lished the fact that Harrah's South Shore Corporation was a business conduit for
Harrah's Club in California.
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California Code of Civil Procedure § 411 provides in part:
The summons must be served by delivering a copy thereof as
follows:
2. If the suit is against a foreign corporation, or nonresident joint
stock company or association, doing business in this State; in the
manner provided by Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Cor-
porations Code.
The pertinent sections of the Corporations Code authorize service
of process upon a foreign corporation by service upon: the president
or other designated officers of the corporation within the State, or
any natural person designated by the corporation as its agent for
purposes of service of process, or at the office of a corporate agency
designated by the corporation to receive service of process. If such
person or corporate agent cannot be found, or if no agent has been
designated, then a court may make an order that service be made by
personal delivery to the Secretary of State.'
The United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Wlashington3 stated the 'due process' test, applicable to the imposi-
tion of personal jurisdiction upon a foreign corporation, in terms of
necessity for finding sufficient contacts between the defendant and
the forum state to make it reasonable and just, according to tradi-
tional concepts of fairness, for the forum state to assume jurisdic-
tion.' Although the 'due process' test, as set forth by the Supreme
Court, was not necessarily a compelling guide for the California
courts in defining the phrase, 'doing business,' it is apparent that
the California courts have chosen to follow that test.' As a result,
the California courts are no longer concerned with a factual inquiry
into whether or not a foreign corporation is quantitatively doing
business in this state. The courts now attempt to find sufficient
'minimum contacts' so that under the particular circumstances of
each case it would not be unfair to assume personal jurisdiction over
2 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 6500, 6501.
3 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In the International Shoe Co. case the State of Washington
was attempting to enforce against the foreign corporation obligations which arose
from activities on the behalf of the foreign corporation carried on in that state.
4 Id. at 319-20. See Small, "Doing Business": Jurisdiction, Qualification and Taxa-
tion Applications, 11 U.C.L.A.L. R v. 259, 264-65 (1964).
5 Note, Suing Foreign Corporations in California, 5 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1953).
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a foreign corporation by means of a substituted service of process.'
Thus the test has become qualitative, and is to be determined by a
'balancing of the interests' involved.7
Some of the more important factors considered by the California
courts in deciding that a foreign corporation has had sufficient con-
tacts to constitute 'doing business' in the state are: ownership of
property; presence of an office within the state; presence of em-
ployees, soliciting agents, salesmen, corporate officers, or stockhold-
ers; local advertising; and maintenance of a local bank account. It
has been pointed out that probably none of these factors alone is
conclusive, but the courts will require combinations of them.
The California Supreme Court in Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior
Court' identified the elements to be weighed in determining whether
California should take jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
The interest of the state in providing a forum for its residents ...
or in regulating the business involved ... ; the relative availability
of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one
place rather than another ... ; and the extent to which the cause
of action arose out of defendant's local activities . are all rele-
vant to this inquiry.10
In Fisher, service on the foreign corporation was accomplished by
making personal service in California upon a non-exclusive manu-
facturer's agent selling the corporation's products. The causes of
action arose in Idaho from deaths caused by an explosion of defec-
tive equipment manufactured by the defendant, an Iowa corporation.
0 The terms 'doing business' and 'minimum contacts' defy concrete definition,
although 'doing business' is now considered analogous to sufficient 'minimum
contacts' under the doctrine laid down in International Shoe. Sufficient 'mini-
mum contacts' apparently will be identified by applying tests of reasonableness
and fair play with regard to the particular circumstances of each case. Post-Inter-
national Shoe cases have indicated that if the cause of action arises out of busi-
ness activity within the forum, less contact with the state will be required than
in cases where the action is based upon activities which took place outside the
forum. Pre-International Shoe cases mae the distinction that if service of process
is completed on an agent of the foreign corporation while 'present' within the
state, it is immaterial whether or not the cause of action was related to the activity
within the state. However, for a court to assert jurisdiction where service was
accomplished by leaving the summons with a designated state official, the cause
of action must have arisen out of business activities within the state. Dambach,
Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern Trends, 5 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 198, 218-20 (1958).
7 Small, supra note 4, at 265. This recent article contains a brief, concise history of
the development of the various theories underlying the exercise of personal juris-
diction by state courts, and points out that none of these theories have been
found adequate to cope with the problems presented by the structure of contem-
porary business concerns and corporate entities involved in multi-state activities.
See generally, Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 911 (1960).
8 Suing Foreign Corporations in California, supra note 5, at 505-06.
9 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rtpr. 1 (1959).
10 Id. at 225-26, 347 P.2d at 3-4, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4.
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The defective equipment had not been sold in California, neither of
the decedents were California residents, nor were any of the plain-
tiffs. The causes of action were not related to any business activities
of the defendant in California, but the plaintiffs contended that the
defendant's sales activities, carried on by means of independent
manufacturer's agents, were sufficient to subject it to the jurisdiction
of California's courts by virtue of service upon one of the manufac-
turer's agents. In declining to assume jurisdiction of the case, the
court pointed out that none of the enumerated factors supported an
assumption of jurisdiction. The causes of action did not arise out of
and were not related to the defendant's activities in California, and
none of the relevant events occurred in California. The court felt
that evidence could be produced as easily or more easily in another
state, and even if the plaintiffs could not secure jurisdiction over the
defendant in Idaho, they could bring their action in Iowa as conven-
iently as in California."
Although the Fisher court denied jurisdiction, the California case
of Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Superior Court2 held
that suit can be brought against a foreign corporation in California
on a cause of action arising outside the state and completely unre-
lated to the foreign corporation's business activities within the state.
In Koninklijke the surviving heirs of five decedents were allowed to
bring wrongful death actions which grew out of an airplane crash
in England against the defendant Dutch corporation. The contacts
of the Dutch corporation with California consisted of: a twenty-four
employee office in Los Angeles, maintained to administer aircraft
contracts in excess of $1,000,000 with California aircraft firms; a
ticket office with four employees who sold tickets on the corpora-
tion's intercontinental airline; local checking accounts from which
the employees were paid; and the registration of four automobiles
in California, serving the transportation needs of its local employees.
Service of process was made upon the corporation's administrative
representative who was in charge of the Los Angeles office and his
assistant who was in charge of personnel in the same office.
31 Id. at 226, 347 P.2d at 4, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 4. Although neither the International
Shoe Court not the Fisher Court mentioned the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
it is apparent that similar considerations are relevant to the application of that
doctrine and to the determination of the existence of sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state. A recent article states: "Since the basic concept of this new
approach is one of fairness, it seems very proper to consider the inconveniences
which would be involved in selecting the appropriate forum. Thus, the hardship
involved in requiring the corporation to defend in the state in which the action
is commenced must be weighed against the inconvenience involved in requiring
the plaintiff and the witnesses to go to the state of the defendant's incorporation."
Dambach, supra note 6, at 218-19.
-12 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951).
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A collection of California cases in Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Superior
Court" is quoted extensively"4 in Brunzell. With the exception of the
Koninklijke decision, the cases collected in Yeck all have a common
ground in that the activities carried on within California related
directly to the cause of action for which the plaintiff was seeking
relief."5 From an analysis of the California cases collected in Yeck,
it appears that the following rules are utilized to determine whether
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation should be assumed: (1) if
the cause of action related directly to the contacts of the corporation
with California, only 'minimum' contacts are necessary; (2) if the
cause of action is unrelated to the contacts, there must be substan-
tially more activity by the corporation in order to support the as-
sumption of jurisdiction.
In Branzell the contacts attributed directly to Harrah's Club were:
it leased and operated a one and one-half acre parking lot and guest
house in California which adjoined its Nevada property in the com-
munity of Stateline, it leased and paid taxes on advertising signs in
California, it assigned debts to California agencies for collection
from California residents, and it maintained listings in California
telephone directories. It would seem that these activities on the part
of Harrah's Club would be sufficient to support the assumption of
jurisdiction if the cause of action related directly to them, but it is
questionable if they should be considered sufficient when the cause
of action is entirely unrelated to the contacts. However, if Harrah's
South Shore Corporation's substantial business activities in Califor-
nia could be attributed to Harrah's Club, then the combined contacts
of the two corporations would be sufficient to support the assump-
tion of personal jurisdiction over Harrah's Club. The respondent
contended that treating the activities of Harrah's South Shore Cor-
13 202 Cal. App. 2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1962). This case involved the issue of
personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
14 225 Cal. App. 2d at 742-43, Cal. App. 2d at 742-43, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 664-65.
'I The activities directly related to California in each case cited in Yeck and relied
upon in Brunzell are: (1) personal injury arising from a sale in California:
Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 (1959);
Thomas v. J. C. Penney Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 223, 8 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1960);
Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co., 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 265 P.2d 130
(1953); Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 2d 490, 244 P.2d 968
(1952); Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Couit, 96 Cal. App. 2d 134, 214 P.2d
541 (1950); Thew Shovel Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 2d 183, 95 P.2d
149 (1939); (2) breach of a contract made in California: Henry R. Jahn & Son
v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958); Iowa Mfg. Co. v.
Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d 503, 246 P.2d 681 (1952); (3) property dam.
age arising from a negligent act in California: Emsco Pavement Breaking Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles, 176 Cal. App. 2d 760, 1 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1959); (4)
unfair competition in California: Florence Nightingale School of Nursing v.
Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 2d 74, 335 P.2d 240 (1959); (5) failure to file
income tax returns with reference to California business: West Publishing Co. v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 720, 128 P.2d 777 (1942). Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Supe-
rior Court, 202 Cal. App. 2d at 651-52, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 54-55.
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poration as those of Harrah's Club would not be proper. The court
utilized a page and a half of its opinion to detail the related activi-
ties of the two corporations, and then responded to the contention
of impropriety by stating:
As heretofore indicated the officers and the boards of directors of
each company are identical and William F. Harrah owns all of the
stock of each of the corporations. Each company is distinctly a one-
man corporation. Under our law where one person owns all of the
stock of a corporation and uses the corporation as a mere conduit
for the transaction of his own business, the corporation is regarded
as his "alter ego".... To adhere to the separate corporate entity
theory in this case would be nothing short of placing a judicial
stamp of approval upon an apparent fraud-here the whole struc-
ture of the various enterprises is transparent. It is crystal dear that
Harrah's South Shore Corporation is nothing but an alter ego, an
alias, a branch, a business conduit or an instrumentality of Harrah's
Club to do in California what Harrah's Club otherwise could not
do.16
The court had no difficulty in finding that the two companies were
but part of the vast holdings owned exclusively by William F. Har-
rah, and did not hesitate to treat the companies as one with respect
to their California activities.
There is a previous California case, Empire Steel Corp. v. Superior
Court,"7 which considers the alter ego doctrine in relation to the
imposition of personal jurisdiction upon a foreign corporation. How-
ever, the Empire Steel case can be distinguished from Brunzell on
several grounds: (1) it involved a wholly owned subsidiary of the
foreign corporation, (2) the cause of action arose directly from the
actions of the subsidiary in California, (3) the plaintiff was a Cali-
fornia resident, and (4) the contract was made and breached in
California. Furthermore, the Empire Steel decision (that the foreign
corporation was amenable to jurisdiction) did not ultimately rely
upon the theory of alter ego. The case was decided upon the ground
that the foreign corporation had itself performed sufficient acts in
California to confer personal jurisdiction by maintaining the sub-
sidiary in business while it was insolvent. 8 Therefore, Brunzell is
the first California case to allow personal jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation, by virtue of substituted service, on the ground that the
foreign corporation was the alter ego of a California corporation.
16 225 Cal. App. 2d at 744, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
17 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P.2d 502, 17 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1961), U.C.L.A.L. REv. 249.
Is Empire Steel v. Superior Court, supra note 17, at 835, 366 P.2d at 509, 17 Cal.
Rptr. at 157. The court felt that the foreign corporation had kept the subsidiary
in business for a period during which it was unsafe for third persons to deal with
the subsidiary.
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The alter ego doctrine was summarized by the California Supreme
Court in Minifie v. Rowlef 9 as follows:
Before the acts and obligations of a corporation can be legally
recognized as those of a particular person, and vice versa, the fol-
lowing combinations of circumstances must be made to appear;
First, that the corporation is not only influenced and governed by
that person, but that there is such a unity of interest and ownership
that the individuality, or separateness, of the said person and corpo-
ration has ceased; second, that the facts are such that an adherence
to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would,
under the particular circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote
injustice.20
In order to apply the alter ego doctrine to a particular case, the
Minifie decision indicates that the circumstances must support a
finding of unity of interest and ownership, and fraud or injustice.
As indicated by the above quotation, the particular circumstances
are important, and, "the occasions when the doctrine will or will
not be applied cannot be reduced to a pat formula."'"
In Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co.2 Molinari, J.,
pointed out that the doctrine does not depend upon the presence of
actual fraud, but is designed to prevent what would be fraud or
injustice if accomplished.
Accordingly, bad faith in one form or another is an underlying
consideration and will be found in some form or another in those
cases wherein the trial court was justified in disregarding the corpo-
rate entity.23
Justice Molinari's Associated Vendors opinion presents a compre-
hensive review of the California cases dealing with the doctrine of
alter ego, and lists a variety of factors considered pertinent by the
various courts:
[1] Commingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate
funds of the separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of
corporate funds or assets to other than corporate uses... ; [2] the
treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his
own ... ; [3] the failure to obtain authority to issue stock or to
subscribe to or issue the same... ; [4] the holding out by an indi-
vidual that he is personally liable for the debts of the corporation
* . . ; [5] the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate
records, and the confusion of the records of the separate entities
... ; [6] the identical equitable ownership in the two entities, the
29 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921).
20 Id. at 487, 202 Pac. at 676.
21 Schifferman, The Alter Ego Doctrine in California, in ADvIsiNG CALIFORNIA
BustNss EN'ERPRISES 785, 795 (1958).
22 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1962).
23 Id. at 838, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
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identification of the equitable owners thereof with the dominion
and control of the two entities; identification of the directors and
officers of the two entities in the responsible supervision and man-
agement; sole ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one
individual or the members of a family . . . ; [7] the use of the
same office or business location; the employment of the same
employees and/or attorney . * , ; [8] the failure to adequately
capitalize a corporation; the total absence of corporate assets, and
undercapitalization . . . ; [9] the use of a corporation as a mere
shell, instrumentality or conduit for a single venture or the busi-
ness of an individual or another corporation . .. ; [10] the con-
cealment and misrepresentation of the identity of the responsible
ownership, management and financial interest, or concealment of
personal business activities . . . ; [il] the disregard of legal for-
malities and the failure to maintain arm's length relationships
among related entities... ; [12] the use of the corporate entity to
procure labor, services or merchandise for another person or entity
. ; [13] the diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a
stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors,
or the manipulation of assets and liabilities between entities so as to
concentrate the assets in one and the liabilities in another...; [14]
the contracting with another with intent to avoid performance by
use of a corporate entity as a shield against personal liability, or
the use of -a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions
••. ; [15] and the formation and use of a corporation to transfer
to it the existing liability of another person or entity.... 4
The opinion also emphasizes that:
A perusal of these cases reveals that in all instances several of the
factors mentioned were present. It is particularly significant that
while it was held, in each instance, that the trial court was war-
ranted in disregarding the corporate entity, the factors considered
by it were not deemed to be conclusive upon the trier of fact but
were found to be supported by substantial evidence.25
It is apparent that some of the factors listed by Justice Molinari
lend themselves to the establishment of a unity of interest or owner-
ship, but not to the establishment of fraud or inequity, in the ab-
sence of other circumstances. On the other hand, some of the factors
listed would tend to establish an apparent fraud or inequity without
necessarily showing any unity of interest or ownership. The factors
applicable to the stated facts in Brunzell are items: (6), (9), and
(12). The Brunzell opinion specifically relies on the fact that the
corporations in question were both solely owned by the same indi-
vidual, and that Harrah's South Shore Corporation was a business
conduit for Harrah's Club."6 Certainly these factors are indicative of
a unity of interest and/or ownership. But wherein lies the fraud or
24 Id. at 838-40, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 813-15.
26 Id. at 840, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
26 225 Cal. App. 2d at 744-45, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
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inequity in such a relationship? In the absence of an illegitimate
purpose, California will recognize the separate entity of a corpora-
tion, wholly owned by one stockholder, if its business is conducted
on a corporate and not a personal basis, and if the enterprise is
established on an adequate financial basis. If the facts in Brunzell
indicated that factors (4), (8), (10), (13), (14), (15), or any one
of them were present, then the court would be warranted in finding
that the ingredients existed for a potential fraud or injustice. 8 But,
taking the case as stated, the only injustice apparent is that the
appellant would have to sue Harrah's Club in Nevada rather than
in California. This can scarcely be viewed as an injustice in view of
the fact that both the plaintiff and the defendant were Nevada resi-
dents, and the cause of action arose in Nevada and had no relation-
ship to the activities of Harrah's Club in California. Sed quaere:
does the use of the alter ego doctrine actually serve any useful pur-
pose in determining whether or not substituted service of process
should be utilized? Even if the element of fraud or injustice is pres-
ent, that factor would not necessarily be pertinent to the issue of
whether the court should or should not assume jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation. If William F. Harrah had concealed other per-
sonal business activities behind the corporate entity of Harrah's
Club in Nevada, would that factor constitute any more reason to
allow California to assume jurisdiction by substituted service in the
Brunzell case, or would it be pertinent to the issue of the assumption
of personal jurisdiction over Harrah's Club if South Shore Corpora-
tion had been undercapitalized in California? Each of these hypo-
thetical situations would create the possibility of a potential fraud
or injustice upon a third person, but neither would seem to be rele-
vant to a decision to allow or disallow Brunzell Construction to try
its suit in California. Furthermore, if the alter ego doctrine is uti-
lized to assume personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation,
would the court ignore the corporate entities for other purposes? For
example, extending the rationale of Brunzell, it would seem reason-
able to allow the Brunzell Company to levy execution upon the
27 See 3 WrriN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2304 (7th ed. 1960). Cf., D. N.
& E. Walter & Co. v. Zuckerman, 214 Cal. 418, 6 P.2d 251 (1931); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 300 and Nav. REv. STAT. tit. 7; ch. 78 § 78.030 (1963), both require
not less than three incorporators to initially incorporate.
28 Schifferman, supra note 21 at 795, states: "li]t is clear that in establishing the
element of unity of interest and ownership, proof of commingling of personal
and corporate funds, payment of personal expenses from corporate funds, dis-
regard of the corporation as a separate entity in transactions and bookkeeping,
failure to apply for a permit to issue stock, and nonconformity to corporation
laws requiring the holding of stockholders' and directors' meetings will all be of
significance. Important as bearing upon the fraud or injustice element will be the
ingredients of insolvency, inadequate capitalization, unjust enrichment, and exemp.
tion of property from levy of attachment or execution. These examples are merely
illustrative, and are not at all inclusive."
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assets of the South Shore Corporation in California once Brunzell
had obtained a judgment against Harrah's Club.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the court in Brunzell based
its holding on two theories: (1) that Harrah's Club, because of its
own activities, was 'doing business' in California, and (2) that
Harrah's South Shore Corporation was the alter ego of Harrah's
Club. A study of the case reveals that neither theory constituted
dicta, but rather that they were alternative methods of finding juris-
diction. Thus, in a future case, either theory could stand alone on
the authority of Brunzell. It is submitted that if unity of interest or
ownership exists between a foreign corporation and a California
corporation (similar to that which existed between Harrah's Club
and Harrah's South Shore Corporation) the court would be war-
ranted in assuming personal jurisdiction over the foreign corpora-
tion by means of substituted service if the cause of action related to
the activities carried on by the two corporations in California. If
the cause of action did not relate to the activities carried on by the
two corporations in the forum, then the foreign corporation should
actually be present in the forum or have substantially more contacts
with the forum, sufficient to make it fair and reasonable to assume
personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation.29 Resort to the
alter ego doctrine should not be necessary in order to determine
whether the court should or should not assume personal jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation by means of substituted service of
process. If the doctrine is utilized, the particular facts of the case
should support a finding of unity of interest and fraud or injustice,
and both elements should be the basis of the cause of action upon
which the plaintiff relies in seeking to obtain substituted service of
process.
Alonzo K. Wood III
29 An example of substantial contacts would be activities such as those carried on by
the foreign corporation in Koninklijke. See also 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 249, 253. if
one assumes that the Brunzell court reached a proper conclusion in that Harrah's
Club and Harrah' South Shore Corporation were the alter egos of their sole
stockholder, William F. Harrah, is it proper to assume jurisdiction by virtue of
CAL. CODE Cv. PROc. § 411 which applies to suits against foreign corporations?
Logic dictates that if the corporate entity is to be disregarded for jurisdictional
purposes, then there is no corporation involved (because it is merely the 'alter
ego' of an individual) and the service of process statute dealing with corpora-
tions should be inapplicable.
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